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In the philosophy of perception, olfaction is the perennial problem child, presenting a range
of difﬁculties to those seeking to deﬁne its proper referents, and its phenomenological
content. Here, we argue that many of these difﬁculties can be resolved by recognizing
the object-like representation of odors in the brain, and by postulating that the basic
objects of olfaction are best deﬁned by their biological value to the organism, rather than
physicochemical dimensions of stimuli. Building on this organism-centered account, we
speculate that the phenomenological space of olfaction is organized into a number of coarse
affective dimensions that apply categorically. This organization may be especially useful for
coupling sensation to decision making and instrumental action in a sensory modality where
the stimulus space is especially complex and high dimensional.
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Describing the phenomenology of smells is notoriously difﬁcult.
Why is this? One idea is that odor percepts are “impoverished,”
as they are initially processed by phylogenetically older parts of
the brain via a shallow processing stream, with no obligatory
relay in the thalamus. By this logic, olfaction is presumed to
be something like visual sensation in cortically blind individu-
als: there is some basic stimulus awareness, but stimuli simply
are not perceived in a feature-rich way that provides grist for
analysis and description. One might, alternatively, interpret the
putative computational shortcomings of olfaction as artifacts of
the representational problem to which the olfactory system is
addressed. Visual and auditory processing transform topograph-
ically encoded physical quantities into representations of stable
object properties that facilitate physically interactive behavior like
object recognition, reaching, grasping, orienting, or avoiding.
Olfactory processing, on the other hand, begins with a diverse,
high dimensional, and niche-speciﬁc set of physicochemical stim-
uli (Bargmann, 2006), and yields affective responses that facilitate
the evaluation of the biological signiﬁcance of stimuli. These
object features and phenomenological responses don’t sort eas-
ily into a clear metric for organizing and understanding either the
physicochemical space of odorants or the phenomenal space of
olfactory experience. The conjunction of these facts about the dis-
orderly stimulus space and phenomenology of olfaction has led
some philosophers to question whether olfactory percepts have
any representational content at all (see Batty, forthcoming):
“Smell has little in the way of apparent structure and often ﬂoats free
of any apparent object, remaining a primitive presence in our sensory
manifold”
(Chalmers, 1996)
“Phenomenologically speaking, a smell is just a modiﬁcation of our
consciousness, a qualitative condition or event in us”
(Lycan, 2000)
“a sensation of [smell]. . .may have no representational content of any
sort, though of course the sensation will be of a distinctive kind”
(Peacocke, 1983)
Recent research suggests that philosophical skepticism about
the representational capacities of olfactory perception is a straw
man, and more importantly, perhaps beside the point. Stimu-
lus representation isn’t the primary business of olfaction. Rather,
its job is solving a problem of valuation, rapidly encoding the
biological salience of a stimulus and priming our multisensory
representation of it to contextually appropriate action.
We develop our perspective in two parts. We ﬁrst review physi-
ological and functional imaging studies showing that it is quite
appropriate to regard odors as objects – that is, as perceptual
phenomena bearing most of the hallmarks of object-based pro-
cessing. In doing this, we underscore the critical idea that the
“feature-poor” nature of odor objects is not a bug, but rather an
important computational feature of the system tagged to the func-
tion of olfactory representations in the broader cognitive economy
of human perceptual systems. In fact, the olfactory system is amply
equipped to represent information about discrete molecular fea-
tures, yet actively discards or reformats these representations in
favor of more economical or parsimonious representations. In
the second part of our perspective, we speculate on what these
representations might be. In brief, we suggest that the objects
of olfaction consist of coarsely speciﬁed and categorical affec-
tive dimensions that each serve as an invitation to a prescribed
kind of action or consummatory behavior. By“affective,”wemean
to designate bodily states that carry information about the bio-
logical value of a stimulus, and that serve as the foundation for
approach and withdrawal behaviors. We propose that a given
odor percept is a coordinate point along one of these dimen-
sions, and furthermore that these dimensions are best deﬁned
from the perspective of the organism in an ecological context.
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This “reorienting” of perception may help develop a satisfying
philosophical stance on olfaction that also provides impetus for
physiological study.
ODORS AS OBJECTS
Philosophical skepticism about the representational capacities of
olfaction arises as a question about the nature of olfactory per-
cepts: do smells represent discrete, publically shareable perceptible
objects as visual percepts do or are they more akin to subjec-
tive feelings, affective states that carry interoceptive information
about bodily state?We think that this distinction is ill-formed. For
instance, a range of recent studies demonstrate that many of the
hallmarks of object-based visual processing readily apply to olfac-
tion. We can, for example, segregate an odor from its surround,
recognize discrete, non-overlapping “views” as representations of
the same odor object, categorize different odors as exemplars of
the same type, and discriminate individual stimuli within cate-
gories of odor objects (Stevenson and Wilson, 2007; Gottfried,
2010; and references therein). Critically, however, the chemosen-
sory features that support this kind of object-based processing are
unavailable to conscious awareness. The olfactory system therefore
extracts information about the ensemble of structural features
in a molecule and uses it to discriminate and identify smells in
the local environment, as this information is readily encoded
in bulbar and early cortical representations of the anterior piri-
form cortex (APC) (Gottfried et al., 2006; Kadohisa and Wilson,
2006). However, and this is the real rub, the olfactory system
ultimately reformats this stimulus information into a range of
affective dimensions efﬁciently tuned to the behavioral needs of
the perceiver.
In this regard, it is interesting to consider the different neural
codes employed to encode stimulus information by theAPCvs. the
posterior piriform cortex (PPC). To broadly summarize a number
of studies (see Gottfried, 2010), the distributed patterns of odor-
evoked activity in APC encode a snapshot of the composite sum
of an odor’s constituent features as a conﬁgural cue. Over time,
the connectivity that deﬁnes these distributed activation patterns
is reinforced and comes to serve as a template, or a cue-dependent,
content addressablememory of the constituent image of that odor.
In this context a novel view or degraded stimulus might contain
sufﬁcient information to activate a memory representation of the
target odorant, accounting for perceptual constancy across sniffs
and natural ecological variance.
Neural codes in the PPC, in contrast, may encode qualitative
perceptual similarities and differences among individual odorants,
facilitating the construction of common odor categories that are
called upon in categorization and discrimination tasks. Although
the distributions of activity for odors differing in perceptual qual-
ity are spatially diffuse and overlapping like their APC cousins,
multi-voxel pattern analysis (which is sensitive to the particular
distribution of activity) in PPC demonstrates that qualitatively
distinct odorants elicit unique patterns of activation. Notably, the
degree of overlap among qualitatively similar odorants is higher
than for dissimilar odorants, and voxel-wise patterns can be used
to accurately predict category membership for a given stimulus
(Howard et al., 2009). The quality space of conscious olfactory
perception thus seems well-modeled as a value space deﬁned by
the relative pleasantness of odorants, and shaped in part by asso-
ciative learning. In this regard, the object information carried in
conscious olfactory events is information about the signiﬁcance of
odor sources to our apical and instrumental goals.
ODOR ECOLOGY
As many have noted (Yeshurun and Sobel, 2010), and intuition
will conﬁrm, it is trivially easy to report whether one likes a given
smell. Notably, this “readiness” to like or dislike doesn’t extend
to visual stimuli, suggesting there may be range of tacit value
judgments that are intrinsic to olfactory objects. Thinking about
these phenomenological differences in light of the distinct eco-
logical contexts in which vision versus olfaction predominate can
be instructive. Visual objects are sensorimotor representations of
stimulus structure that articulate the shape, identity and affor-
dances of objects and events so that we can recognize them, orient
our bodies to them and interact with them. Simply stated, ﬁne
grained shape information is what we need to accomplish these
tasks. An olfactory object, we would argue, is a qualitative judg-
ment of the biological signiﬁcance of the odor source, its utility to
our metabolic needs and the apical goal of survival – an implicit
decision about whether something is worth approaching, or is best
avoided.
To early single-celled denizens of the pre-Cambrian, count-
ing double-bonds and tallying functional groups on a molecule
were probably not useful in themselves. Rather, they were likely
only useful to the extent that they led to good decisions about
whether toxins, nutrients, and discrete signals from conspeciﬁcs
were ﬂed, pursued, ingested, or prompted consummatory behav-
ior. An upshot of this view is that it readily explains those
well-known cases in which chemicals with quite different struc-
tures elicit highly similar percepts (their physical differences aside,
they happen to point to the same biological need/want), and vice
versa – chemicals that are close “neighbors” in physicochemical
space may elicit very different percepts (their physical similari-
ties aside, one is a toxin, say, whereas the other is a nutrient).
By carving the phenomenal space of olfaction into a number
of prescribed affective categories (which can be plied substan-
tially by experience), evolution may have ensured that olfactory
perception is intimately coupled to stimulus-prompted decision
making.
THE PRIMACY OF AFFECT, AND ITS MANIFESTATION IN
OLFACTORY BRAIN AREAS
The primacy of affect in olfactory experience has long been
appreciated, and recent work applying dimensionality reduction
techniques to odor proﬁling databases underscores this basic idea.
Khan et al. (2007) and Zarzo (2011) used principal components
analysis to identify hedonic valence as a factor accounting for about
40% of the variance in olfactory percepts when a wide range
of odors is assessed. Intriguingly, when similar dimensionality
reduction techniques were applied independently to the physico-
chemical space of odors, the major axis of this space – something
like“molecular compactness”–wasmapped onto hedonic valence.
In a sense then, pleasantness is “written into” a monomolecu-
lar odorant. In studies extending these sorts of analyses above, a
second (though much more speculative) candidate dimension –
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“edibility” – has been postulated (Zarzo, 2008). We note that
many other candidate dimensions have been proposed by oth-
ers as well, however, the existence and commonality of these is
contested.
Consistent with this claim on the primacy of affect, affect
has interesting correlates even in the most peripheral stages of
olfactory processing. Whereas the receptor epithelia for vision,
audition, and somatosensation are topographically organized to
encode information about spatial proximity and/or basic physical
variables pertaining to stimuli, the (human) olfactory epithelium
appears to represent relative stimulus pleasantness topographically
(Lapid et al., 2011). Similar principles of organization by hedonic
valence also seem to extend to early central brain representations
in both mammals and invertebrates (Haddad et al., 2010).
Building off of this work, we speculate that the affective (hedo-
nic) dimension of olfactory experience is fundamental, and that
olfactory categories, as a result, carry information about the behav-
ioral salience of their sources as opposed to the speciﬁc identities
of either the odorant perceived or its source (see also Mam-
louk et al., 2003). We are not claiming that the olfactory system
fails to map those features of the sensory periphery that facilitate
object discrimination, recognition, etc., Indeed, certain elemental
features of monomolecular odor stimuli, including information
about constituent functional groups, are readily encoded and
available to the olfactory system, as seen above. However, we pro-
pose that they are encoded in conscious olfactory experience as
a ﬁxed (if potentially quite large) number of coarsely speciﬁed
affective dimensions. Put more plainly: the olfactory system is
not a casual art viewer, who slowly scans the individual brush-
strokes on a painting and dithers on whether these add up to
something he likes or doesn’t. The olfactory system is instead
a curmudgeonly and narrow-minded critic who knows he loves
Picasso, despises Monet, is indifferent to Kandinsky, and rapidly
judges the value of a work by its resemblance to one of these
categories.
While pleasantness is undisputably a key organizing dimension
of olfaction, and the one that currently has the deepest experimen-
tal support, it needn’t be the only dimension. Organismsmay have
multiple ways of evaluating odors as good, and multiple ways of
evaluating them as bad. For example, ﬂoral odors may have one
set of affordances (approach, but do not necessarily consume),
whereas odors comparable in pleasantness – say citrus odors –
may have another set of affordances (approach and consume).
In short, olfactory percepts may be deﬁned by multiple categor-
ical affective dimensions, rather than a single smoothly varying
dimension.
In our own studies, we recently revisited the issue of perceptual
organization in odor proﬁling data, using non-negativematrix fac-
torization (NMF) instead of principal components analysis, and
observed that odor proﬁles are well described by ∼10 percep-
tual dimensions (Castro et al., 2013). Notably, these dimensions
were near-orthogonal, despite the fact that orthogonality is not
guaranteed by NMF, and appeared to apply categorically: that is,
a given odor tended to belong to one perceptual dimension to
the exclusion of others. Interestingly, the basic dimensions identi-
ﬁed all seemed to have clear ecological value. Future work will be
needed to extend these ﬁndings to larger panels of odorants, and
to test whether there are neural substrates of the coarse affective
categorization we propose.
Nevertheless, these sorts of either-or representations may have
some observable analogs in olfactory physiology. The possible cat-
egorical nature of odor representations is supported by studies
performing slow “morphs” between two different odors, in which
the concentration of one odor is gradually decreased, while the
other is slowly ramped up. In these studies, one observes rapid
changes in ensemble activity in the olfactory bulb (Niessing and
Friedrich, 2010), implying that at least for some considerations
of odor pairs, the bulb has a ﬁxed number of preferred discrete
states, rather than smoothly spanning the potential state space.
More centrally, at the level of piriform cortex, Yoshida and Mori
(2007) have observed categorical representations for food odors in
theAPC,whereasHoward et al. (2009) have usedmulti-voxel anal-
ysis in human fMRI studies to show clustered hotspots of activity
in PPC that correspond to speciﬁc odor qualities (minty, woody,
citrus, etc).
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
By summarizing recent work on object-based processing in olfac-
tion, as well as odor ecology, we have argued that the basic
phenomenological objects of olfaction are not things “out there”
but rather prescribed affective categories – likely niche and organ-
ism speciﬁc – to which stimuli are rapidly assigned, and which
are richly pliable through learning and with context. We are quick
to note, of course, that we are not arguing that odor stimuli are
irrelevant to this categorization process. Our account is necessar-
ily speculative, but aligns in several compelling ways with existing
results, and makes predictions about the types of representations
one expects to ﬁnd in the olfactory system. Contrary to some
of the modern philosophical thinking on olfaction, we speculate
that a careful and exhaustive cataloging of behaviors supported by
olfaction may be a key to understanding the phenomenology of
odors.
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